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Transitional Justice and Reparations: Remedying the Past? 
By Luke Moffett 
in Research Handbook on Transitional Justice (Dov Jacobs ed., Edward Elgar, forthcoming 
2015)  
Abstract 
Reparations are often considered victim-centred transitional justice measures. While they 
have their basis in private law notions of corrective justice and the human rights principle of 
remedy, politics and economic resources often shape reparations in times of transition. 
Reparations in transitional justice often take time and require revisiting as society becomes 
conscious of previously hidden or marginalised victims. Added to this is the challenge of 
delimiting those who are eligible, contested victimhood, and determining when the transition 
ends. This raises questions of whether reparations are appropriate for historical violations 
caused by colonial governments or slavery. The chapter examines individual and collective 
reparations, apportionment amongst family members, reparation processes and mechanisms, 
as well as evidential and financial concerns. Although public resources may be limited in 
providing full compensatory awards to all victims, small sums or pensions along with public 
acknowledgement of victims’ suffering, wrongfulness of the perpetrators and institutions’ 
acts, along with guarantees of non-repetition can be ‘good enough’. This chapter argues that 
despite the political wrangling of reparations during transition, the right to reparations in 
international law reflects the necessity of states to deliver reparations to victims of serious 
violations.  
 
Reparations are increasingly resorted to both symbolise healing and to remedy the 
consequences of collective violence in times of transition. In contrast to demobilisation 
programmes or prosecutions, reparations represent more victim-centred transitional justice 
measures. At their most basic level reparations are intended to redress harm caused to victims. 
The 2005 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (UNBPG) states that reparations are intended to ‘promote 
justice by redress’.1 However reparations in transition justice are complex legal constructions, 
often shaped and entangled with political, social and moral contentions.  
Although there is clear moral impetus to do justice for victims and to alleviate their 
plight, reparations are often not implemented by states. Even when they are adopted, the law 
is limited in its ability to do justice, in that it cannot undo the egregious harm caused by 
disappearances, torture or sexual violence. Added to this is that victims may number in their 
millions and post-conflict countries can be ravaged, leaving little resources to provide 
                                                     
1 Principle 15, A/RES/60/147. Hereafter referred to as the UN Basic Principles of Reparation. 
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reparations to each victim. Moreover identities of victimhood and narratives of the conflict or 
the past can intensify contention around reparations. In all despite the prospect of reparations 
to provide a more tangible form of justice to victims, the reality is that most states emerging 
from collective violence fail to deliver such measures.2 
 This chapter explores these issues of reparations in transitional justice beginning with 
their historical and international use, before moving to examine the theoretical basis and 
practical bounds of reparation. The subsequent section examines eligibility for reparations, 
taking in to account contested identities of victim and perpetrator, the temporal limits on the 
remedial nature of transitions, and individual and collective needs. We then move on to 
consider who is responsible for making reparations, noting the traditional state-centric model 
is imperfect for the growing nature of internal armed conflicts and atrocities committed by 
non-state actors. The final section explores the process and mechanisms in delivering 
reparations.  
I. Reparations in historical and international perspective 
Reparations are rooted in private law remedies, such as tort and delicts, reflecting more 
ancient principles of corrective justice. Aristotle theorised that corrective or rectificatory 
justice should correct the harm suffered by the injured party by trying to return to the position 
they were in before the harm.3 Corrective justice is concerned with re-establishing equality 
between the injured party and perpetrator, a mathematical formula, rather than about ensuring 
fairness.4 Accordingly, remedy under private law is based on the premise of seeking to return 
the victim to the status quo ante (original position) through restitutio in integrum (returning to 
the victim all they have lost).5 These private law principles have informed international law 
                                                     
2 Pablo de Greiff, Report by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and 
guarantees of non-recurrence, A/69/518, 8 October 2014; and Olsen et al. note that out of 84 
transitional countries only 14 have implemented reparation programmes. Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. 
Payne and Andrew G. Reiter, Transitional Justice In Balance Comparing Processes, Weighing 
Efficacy, (USIP 2010), at 53. 
3 Aristotle, Nicomechean Ethics, Book V. 
4 D.D. Raphael, Concepts of Justice, (Oxford University Press 2003), at 43. 
5 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, (OUP 2005, 2nd edn), at 9 and 65. 
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where a breach by a state of a primary obligation requires reparation to be made to an injured 
party. As stated in the seminal Chorzow Factory case reparations should, 
as far as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the 
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been 
committed…It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement 
involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form.6 
In times of transition reparations have moved beyond the individual-centricity of private law 
and the state-centric nature of international law, to acknowledge that individuals have 
standing to claim reparations from states. Perhaps one of the most successful reparation 
programmes has been compensation paid by Germany and other countries to victims of the 
Holocaust and the state of Israel.7 As discussed below, such success is based on the moral 
indignation, public attention to the justification of reparations, and available resources that 
make such large awards possible.  
The advent of human rights has cemented the individual’s right to reparation to 
recognise the protection of the individual in international law against excesses of power of the 
state.8 There is growing customary practice of individuals’ right to reparation against the state 
and non-state actors in armed conflict and gross violations of human rights.9 More recently, 
the international personality of the individual has been expanded to include individual 
responsibility for reparations under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.10 
This international attention to reparations has also seen general and discrete international 
                                                     
6 Germany v Poland, The Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (The Merits), Permanent Court of 
International Justice, File E. c. XIII. Docket XIV:I Judgment No. 13, 13 September 1928 (‘Chorzów 
Factory’ case), §125. 
7 See Gideon Taylor, Greg Schneider and Saul Kagan, The Claims Conference and the Historic Jewish 
Efforts for Holocaust-Related Compensation and Restitution, in C. Ferstman, M. Goetz, and A. 
Stephens (eds.), Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 
Systems in Place and Systems in the Making, (Martinus Nijhoff 2009), 103-113.  
8 Antonio Augusto Cançado-Trindade, The Access of Individuals to International Justice, (Oxford 
University Press 2011). Recognised in international law in Legal Consequences of the Construction of 
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (2004) 136 §§151-153. 
9 UN Basic Principles of Reparations; Article 75, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; 
Christine Evans, The Right to Reparations in International Law for Victims of Armed Conflict, 
(Cambridge University Press 2012), p43; ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Database 
Rule 150; and Declaration of International Law Principles on Reparation for Victims of Armed 
Conflict, Resolution No.2 (2010), International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Reparation for 
Victims of Armed Conflict. 
10  See Mariana Goetz, Reparative Justice at the International Criminal Court: Best practice or 
tokenism? in J. Wemmers (ed.), Reparation for Victims of Crimes against Humanity: The healing role 
of reparation, (Routledge 2014) 55-70, p64. 
 4 
declarations and conventions emerge.11 While reparations originate in private law corrective 
justice notions, there is growing recognition and legal guidelines affirming their normative 
and customary nature in the face of mass atrocities.  
Regional human rights courts have been at the forefront of developing reparation 
jurisprudence. Yet they recognise the limits of the law, in that returning victims who have 
been killed or torture to the original position as ‘impossible, insufficient, and inadequate’.12 
Judge Cançado Trindade suggests, ‘reparation cannot “efface” [a violation], but it can rather 
avoid the negative consequences of the wrongful act.’13 Human rights courts have firmly 
established the principle of full and effective remedy for gross violations of human rights. 
The human rights remedial approach has three components: acknowledgement; responsibility; 
and remedy. As such reparations intend to publicly acknowledge the suffering and dignity of 
the victim, as well as to affirm the wrongful nature of the perpetrator’s action. Reparations are 
made by the responsible party, and are delivered through measures intended to alleviate the 
victims’ suffering. Thus reparations in human rights law is much about remedying victims’ 
harm as it is about reaffirming the legal order and awakening public consciousness about such 
victimisation to prevent its reoccurrence.  
The remedial human rights approach is effected through five types of reparation to 
redress the harm of victims of gross violations of human rights: restitution; compensation; 
rehabilitation; measures of satisfaction; and guarantees of non-repetition. While developed 
from the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and practice in Latin 
American in the 1980s-1990s, they are now widely accepted and part of the 2005 UN Basic 
Principles on Reparations (UNBPG).14 Restitution includes restoration of property or rights. 
Compensation involves both pecuniary and non-pecuniary awards to cover the cost and moral 
                                                     
11 In particular the 2005 UNBPG, 2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance, the 2007 Nairobi Declaration on Women’s and Girls’ Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation, International Law Association Resolution No.2 on Reparation for Victims of Armed 
Conflict (2010); and Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, UN Guidance Note of the 
Secretary-General, June 2014. 
12 Blake v Guatemala, Reparations, Series C No. 48 (IACtHR, 22 January 1999). 
13  Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo), Compensation Judgment, ICJ Reports (2012) 324, para.26. 
14 From the initial case of Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 7 
(IACtHR, 21 July 1989); and Principles 19-23, UNPBG. 
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harm suffered by victims, whether through a lump sum or a pension. Rehabilitation entails 
physical and mental care, as well as social services to heal a victim’s personal integrity and 
social functioning. Measures of satisfaction are public acknowledgements of victims’ harm 
and symbolic redress to reaffirm their dignity, such as memorials, apologies, recovery of 
those disappeared, and investigations. Guarantees of non-repetition are public commitments 
and reforms by the state to prevent violations recurring in the future, such as human rights 
training of the armed forces and civilian oversight. These five types of reparations 
complement each other in holistically remedying victims’ suffering from gross violations of 
human rights.  
This remedial approach can also better protect minorities or discriminated groups, as 
returning them to their original position before the harm may reinforced inequalities or 
structural victimisation that gave rise to their suffering. 15  It can be sensitive to gender, 
indigenous and children’s rights, reflecting that the experience of harm to such groups is 
different, due to discrimination, communal rights, or impact of violence on their development. 
While this may cause perception of creating a hierarchy of victims and not treating them all 
equally,16 an important and meaningful aspect of reparations is to tailor, as far as possible, 
appropriate remedies that can alleviate the suffering and causes of victimisation.  
For instance, the Inter-American Court in Serrano Cruz Sisters v El Salvador as part 
of a reparations package established parameters for a national commission to trace children 
who had disappeared during the armed conflict, ordered the creation of website to support the 
search, as well as a DNA database and a national day of commemoration for children 
disappeared during the conflict.17 Similarly in the Plan de Sánchez Massacre case involving 
the massacre of 268 civilians the Inter-American Court ordered rehabilitation including a 
housing and development programme, a healthcare centre, Mayan education, and 
                                                     
15 Heidi Rombouts and Stephan Parmentier, The International Criminal Court and its Trust Fund are 
Coming of Age: Towards a Process Approach for the Reparation of Victims, International Review of 
Victimology 16 (2009) 149–182. 
16 Mijke de Waardt, Are Peruvian Victims Being Mocked?: Politicization of Victimhood and Victims’ 
Motivations for Reparations, Human Rights Quarterly 35 (2013) 830–849, p840. 
17 Judgment of 1 March 2005, (Merits, Reparations and Costs), paras.183-193 and 196. 
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infrastructure (a road, sewage, and potage water system) for the remaining 317 survivors, 
along with compensation awards for each.18 Such full reparation sits uneasily with practical 
considerations and wider objectives in times of transition. 
II. The theoretical and practical bounds of reparations in times of 
transition 
Despite the growing international acceptance of reparations, in times of transition it can be 
unworkable to provide full redress to all victims of mass atrocities. Human rights courts are 
generally responding to individual cases, redressing only a fraction of the total victimised 
population in a country who can number in their hundreds of thousands of victims. The effect 
of this case-by-case approach is two-fold according to de Greiff, whereby it both 
disaggregates victims and disaggregates reparations.19 With disaggregating victims, there is 
generally unequal access to courts, which are more likely to be used by urban elites, and it 
distinguishes individuals from each other based on their own harm. In disaggregating 
reparations, case-by-case awards cause discrepancies by individualising reparations, rather 
than providing comprehensive redress. This section explores reparations in times of transition 
in terms of its theoretical and practical bounds, by discussing it as a political project, its 
transformational potential and as part of comprehensively dealing with the past. 
A. Reparations as a political project 
Reparations in transitional justice represent more of a political project, promoting wider goals 
than justice to encompass other aims, such as reconciliation, peace or economic 
development.20 In such circumstances the intention of reparations for victims is to serve to 
‘contribute to the reconstitution or the constitution of a new political community’ by 
remedying the violations of the past and preventing future victimisation.21 Reparations have a 
symbolic component, in that they ‘symbolically acknowledge and recognise the individual’s 
                                                     
18 Plan de Sánchez Massacre v Guatemala, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 116 (IACtHR, 
19 November 2004). 
19 Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in P. de Greiff (ed.), Handbook of Reparations, (OUP 
2006) 451-477, p458. 
20 Ibid. p454; Lisa Magarrell, Reparations for massive or widespread human rights violations: Sorting 
out claims for reparations and social justice, Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 22 (2003) 85–98, 
p94. 
21 De Greiff supra note 19, p454. 
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suffering … can help concretise a traumatic event, aid an individual to come to terms with it 
and help label responsibility.’ 22  It can also reflect the ‘social, moral, psychological and 
religious meanings’ attached to official efforts to redress the past, such as public apologies 
and acknowledgement of responsibility, memorials and commemorations. 23  Such public 
recognition and physical space can help victims in their grieving process by offering focal 
points that maintain the memory of their loved one.24  
Reparations in transitional societies can also serve a political function in rebuilding 
the victim’s ‘civic trust’ with other citizens and in the state, and reaffirming their dignity by 
prioritising their suffering as deserving redress.25 This sits in stark contrast to the past where 
they were vilified, dehumanised and targeted. In building this new political community, social 
solidarity and inclusion is extended to victims as citizens entitled to a remedy. While of 
course there are not enough resources to fully or completely remedy victims’ harm, Hamber 
suggests the notion of ‘good enough’, whereby sufficient effort and recognition is made to 
victims leaves them psychological satisfied, in turn rebuilding community and societal 
bonds.26 
Reparations in transitional justice processes also have to contend with responding to 
large victim populations and balancing resource concerns, rather than the more juridical, 
individual, isolated cases before regional human rights courts.27 Attention to reparations can 
be inhibited by priorities of reconstruction, increased public space for marginalise groups to 
have access to resources, more public proceedings of criminal trials or truth commissions, and 
obligations to international financial institutions can all inhibit the attention to reparations.28 
                                                     
22 Brandon Hamber, Repairing the irreparable: Dealing with the double-binds of making reparations for 
crimes of the past, Ethnicity and Health 5(3/4) (2000) 215-226, p218. 
23 Geneviève Painter, Towards Feminist Theoretical Approaches to Reparations (Conference Paper, 
September 2006) p4, quoted by Anne Saris and Katherine Lofts, Reparation Programmes: A Gendered 
Perspective, in Ferstman et al. supra note 7, 79-99, at 86. 
24 Brandon Hamber, The dilemmas of reparations: In search of a process-driven approach, in K. De 
Feyter, S. Parmnetier, M. Bossuyt and P. Lemmens (eds.), Out of the Ashes: Reparation for Victims of 
Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations (Intersentia 2005), 135-149, p137. 
25 Magarrell supra note 20, p91. 
26 Hamber supra note 24, p137. 
27 De Greiff supra note 19, p451. 
28 Alexander Segovia, Financing Reparations Programs Reflections from International Experience, in 
de Greiff supra note 19, 650-675, p653-654. 
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If a reparation programme is adopted, further resources and expertise is needed to administer 
awards, adding to the cost, before any money reaches victims. It is impossible to generalise 
about reparations and transitional justice with certainty, as each country has to be taken its 
own political and socioeconomic circumstances.29 While a country may suffer from endemic 
poverty, it does not mean that the government will not prioritise reparations. Countries such 
as Argentina and Sierra Leone have successfully implemented reparation programmes despite 
their limited fiscal capacity.30  
The political nature and resources constraints of reparations in times of transition can 
dilute the components of acknowledgement, responsibility and remedy. Acknowledgement of 
victims’ suffering can be framed around the government’s narrative of the past. For instance 
in Argentina the victim group Madres de Plaza de Mayo rejected reparations as ‘blood 
money’, as it involved accepting the ‘two devils’ discourse of state and guerrilla violence, 
legitimising the state’s use of torture and disappearances of their children and 
grandchildren.31 In terms of responsibility, transitional justice reparation mechanisms tend to 
be state-centric reflects its traditional roots in inter-state conflicts and post-authoritarianism in 
international law and transitional justice, capturing little of the lived reality of contemporary 
collective violence, which can be committed by private individuals or corporations. 32 
Responsibility for reparations and their remedial effects can be further diminished by being 
subsumed within developmental programmes to affected communities, rather than to victims. 
Accordingly, such programmes can represent more distributive justice, than corrective or 
remedial justice. These issues are explored further in subsequent sections. 
B. Reparations as transformational 
Reparations in times of transition can be both backward and forward looking, in the sense that 
they attempt to redress past violations as well as to prevent future occurrence. This future-
                                                     
29 See Richard Falk, Reparations, International Law and Global Justice: A New Frontier, in de Greiff 
supra note 19, 478-503. 
30 Segovia supra note 28, at 669. 
31 Claire Moon, ‘Who’ll Pay Reparations on My Soul?’ Compensation, Social Control and Social 
Suffering, Social and Legal Studies 21(2) (2012) 187-199, p194. 
32 Discussed further in section IV. 
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looking perspective is intended to tackle the causes of victimisation, such as resource 
allocation, civilian oversight of armed forces, or minorities in government. According to 
Rubin-Marín, reparations can also have a transformational potential ‘to subvert, instead of 
reinforce, pre-existing structural … inequalities and thereby to contribute, however 
minimally, to the consolidation of more inclusive democratic regimes’. 33  Yet reparation 
mechanisms can often silence and marginalise non-elites, and women in particular.34  
With women and girls, a gender perspective has been advocated to be included in 
reparation mechanisms to reflect the wider social inequalities that compound their suffering, 
such as being subjected to sexual and domestic violence, forced to abandon their education or 
career to care for their family after parents or a spouse is killed or seriously injured, suffer a 
loss of income, left to search for the remains of loved ones and to demand justice.35 As such 
to prevent the replication of the class, political, ethnic and gender hierarchies and the causes 
of victimisation, reparations should be developed not only as forward-looking, but include 
backward-looking measures to deliver fair non-discriminatory redress that respond to victims’ 
experience, as far as possible.36 Ladling reparations with such systematic reform is to doom it 
to failure. Instead it requires reparations to be complemented by other measures and 
mechanisms, such as educational and employment law reform. 37  The Peruvian 
Comprehensive Reparations (PIR) noted that in developing a reparations programme, 
...the PIR cannot and should not be considered as one more instrument of social 
policy. The PIR does not seek to resolve problems of poverty, exclusion and 
inequality, which are structural in nature and respond to the overall operation of the 
political and economic system. While some of its programs can and should contribute 
to improving the quality of life of victims and their family members, its central 
objective is the repair and recognition of victims as human beings, whose 
fundamental rights have been violated. This does not mean that the State should not 
also undertake a policy of social development aimed at attacking poverty and 
inequality at the root - and [in fact] the TRC formulates concrete proposals elsewhere 
                                                     
33 Ruth Rubin-Marín, The Gender of Reparations in Transitional Societies, in R. Rubin-Marín (ed.), 
The Gender of Reparations: Unsettling Sexual Hierarchies While Redressing Human Rights Violations, 
(CUP 2009), 63-120, at 66. See Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, UN Guidance Note 
of the Secretary-General, June 2014. 
34  Brandon Hamber and Ingrid Palmary, Gender, Memorialization, and Symbolic Reparations, in 
Rubin-Marín supra note 33, 324-381, at 331. 
35 Ruth Rubin-Marín, A Gender and Reparations Taxonomy, in Rubin-Marín supra note 33, 1-17, at 2. 
36 Rubin-Marín supra note 33, at 101. 
37 Magarrell supra note 20, at 94. 
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in this report on necessary institutional reforms - but the PIR responds to other 
goals.38 
As such, the transformative potential of reparations rests in their ability to prioritise and 
publicise victimisation and underlying structural inequalities that precipitated or compounded 
violence. 
C. Reparations as part of comprehensively dealing with the past 
Transitional justice since the Second World War has been dominated by retributive responses 
through the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, as well as numerous other domestic trials. Only 
in the late 1980s and 1990s was there greater resort to truth commissions and the 
recommendations of reparations.39 The inclusion of reparations with the 1998 Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court reflects that criminal trials and reparations complement 
each other, despite the narrow and individual focus of responsibility in such trials. 40 
Reparations represent an alternative form of accountability from criminal trials, by 
acknowledging the suffering of victims and the wrongfulness of their harm. This is important 
as in times of transition the authoritarian government or peace process may have entailed an 
amnesty to ease the transfer of power to a democratically elected one. There may also be 
evidential difficulties in prosecuting perpetrators in the aftermath of collective violence, as 
witnesses may have died, the passage of time can diminish memory, and material evidence 
can be damaged or destroyed, which together reduce the prospects of criminal sanctions.   
In terms of comprehensively dealing with the past and reconciliation between 
different groups, reparations can also serve to balance concessions and demobilisation 
packages made to combatants.41 As Hazan suggests, reparations can be transactional, such as 
                                                     
38 CVR Final Report, Vol. LX, section 2.2.2.1, p.148, cited and translated by Magarrell supra note 20, 
at 95. 
39 See Arturo J. Carrillo, Justice in Context: The Relevance of Inter-American Human Rights Law and 
Practice to Repairing the Past, in de Greiff supra note 19, at 505-506. Not all truth commissions have 
the power to make reparation recommendations, such as Argentina’s National Commission on the 
Disappeared (CONADEP), Decree No. 187/83, 15 December 1983. 
40 Article 75. See Luke Moffett, Reparative Complementarity: Ensuring an effective remedy for victims 
in the reparation regime of the International Criminal Court, The International Journal of Human 
Rights 17(3) (2013), 368-390. 
41  See Pablo de Greiff, DDR and Reparations: Establishing Links Between Peace and Justice 
Instruments, in K. Ambos, J. Large, and M. Weirda (eds.), Building a Future on Peace and Justice, 
(Springer 2009), 321-355; Heidy Rombouts, Victim Organisations and the Politics of Reparation: A 
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the case with South Africa where ‘the perpetrators obtained amnesty, and the victims received 
reparations in exchange.’42 However victims may lack the political clout, at least initially, in 
political negotiations to ensure effective bargaining power to guarantee that their interests in 
reparations and accountability measures are prioritised.43 This can contrast with members of 
armed forces or non-state armed groups, who have political weight in peace negotiations and 
are often placated to maintain peace and security. Really for reparations to be effective it 
requires political will, compromise, and consultation of victims in their design. But as 
discussed more in the final section, such political willingness and public sensitivity to 
reparations for victims takes time. 
As de Greiff, now UN Special Rapporteur on Truth, Justice, Reparation and 
Guarantees of Non-Repetition, posits ‘what should victims in fairness receive?’ From 
victims’ perspective the human rights law principle of full and effective remedy offer the 
most substantial redress. However, the notion of fairness or justice in transition is not just an 
adjudication between the injured party and the perpetrator, but has to take into account the 
diverse public interests. In times of transition, victims’ right to remedy should remain a 
priority, but their amount of reparation has to be limited, given resource constraints, requiring 
victims’ expectations to managed on what reparations can deliver in times of transition.44  
Although transitional contexts have been informed by private law principles and 
guided to an extent by international law, they generally taken on a political character, 
responding to their own unique circumstances and creating bespoke reparation programmes. 
Reparations are more likely to be implemented and complied with where there is a strong 
coalition amongst political parties in government and as part of their political mandate.45 
However, such political willingness to support regimes may take time, or even generations, in 
particular if a comprehensive approach including other measures is to be included. This can 
                                                                                                                                                        
Case-Study on Rwanda (Intersentia 2004), at 22; and the Final Report of Sierra Leone Truth 
Commission, Vol.II, Chapter 4, §§34-39, and 69. 
42 Pierre Hazan, Measuring the impact of punishment and forgiveness: a framework for evaluating 
transitional justice, International Review of the Red Cross, 88(861) 19-47 (2006), p44.  
43 Lisa Magarrell, Reparations in Theory and Practice, ICTJ (2007), 2.  
44 De Greiff supra note 19, at 457. This is discussed more in the final section on process. 
45 Segovia supra note 28, at 666-667. 
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undermine the remedial effect of reparations, if those victims directly harmed are dead and 
requires developing complicated beneficiary rules for heirs. 46  As a starting point for 
examining the practice of reparations in times of transition, it is perhaps worth discuss who is 
eligible for such measures. 
III. Who is eligible for reparations? 
Victim populations in the aftermath of collective violence or armed conflict can number in the 
hundreds of thousands to even millions. 47 Determining which individuals and groups are 
eligible for reparations is beset with logistical, moral and political challenges.48 The UN Basic 
Principles on Reparations stipulates that victims are those who have, 
individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, 
emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental 
rights, through acts or omissions that constitute gross violations of international 
human rights law, or serious violations of international humanitarian law. Where 
appropriate, and in accordance with domestic law, the term “victim” also includes the 
immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and persons who have suffered 
harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimization. 
This broad definition of victims and notion of harm as a criterion for eligibility is ‘potentially 
limitless’ as during times of conflict or under an authoritarian regime everyone suffers in 
some way. 49  However, the scarcity of resources for countries emerging from collective 
violence or conflict means only certain victims will be entitled to reparations.  
To make reparation programmes and international declarations more feasible, they 
generally concentrate on the most harmful violations of individuals and groups’ civil and 
political rights, such as extra-judicial killings, disappearances, torture and sexual violence. 
The UNBPG itself is limited to victims of serious violations of international humanitarian law 
and gross violations of human rights. Yet this leaves little attention or scope to widen 
reparations to those who have suffered violations of their economic, social or cultural rights.50 
                                                     
46 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice, (OUP 2002) at 141-143. 
47 The UN Claims Commission for violations committed by Iraqi forces in Kuwait in 1991 had 2.7 
million claimants, with 1.5 million successful obtaining $52.4 billion. See Linda A. Taylor, The United 
Nations Compensation Commission, in Ferstman et al supra note 7, 197-215. See UNCC website: 
http://www.uncc.ch/  
48 This chapter does not address more discrete concerns about different types of harm or damage. 
49 Teitel supra note 46, at 134. 
50 See Lars Waldorf, Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic Wrongs, Social 
and Legal Studies 21(2) 171–186.  
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Although developmental or humanitarian programmes could better redress these violations, 
they are more likely to benefit the general population than specific remedy the harm suffered 
by victims. Nonetheless it is possible to some extent to steer a middle course, as countries like 
Morocco and Peru have developed community reparation programmes to redress those who 
have been economically marginalised in the past by the state, discussed further below.51 
The truth commissions in Sierra Leone and Timor Leste recommended that 
reparations should concentrate on those who suffered the most and as a result were made 
vulnerable, such as amputees, orphans, widows, victims of sexual violence, and victims of 
torture.52 As the Timor Leste report states, ‘[w]e are all victims but not all victims are equal. 
We must acknowledge this reality and lend a hand to those who are most vulnerable.’53 
Accordingly while violence touched everybody in some way, some individuals suffered more 
than others. Similarly in Peru individual reparations have been prioritised for elderly victims, 
so they are paid first, given their greater vulnerability and limited time to avail of such 
measures.54 As Magarrell notes in the initial work of the Peruvian Comprehensive Reparation 
Program (PIR) 
while motivated by a desire to address the very real consequences of the violence, 
proved unworkable. First, the universe of harm it intended to redress was enormous 
and the victim population particularly difficult to define. By looking at consequences 
of violations, the increasing size of the population affected was unavoidable. (In fact, 
in that early plan, they expected to be providing reparations for close to two million 
people, about 7 percent of the population.) Individual idiosyncrasies of how people 
were affected by violence increased exponentially as well, making it more and more 
difficult to adequately respond to the long-term situation of each. ... Causation issues 
became mixed with other underlying social problems that exacerbated or coincided 
with harms caused directly by the abuses experienced. By using this approach, 
without tying the analysis to the original violations in a more specific way, 
reparations can become repair for exclusion and lack of social attention to broad 
sectors of the population. Thus, in one fell swoop one can lose the specific 
recognition of human rights victims as such, and frustrate those who suffer the same 
problems but are not included in the program.55 
                                                     
51 Root Rebecca K. Root, Transitional Justice in Peru, Palgrave MacMillan (2012), p134; and Waldorf 
supra note 50, p172. See Section III.D. 
52 TRC Report Vol.II, Chapter 4, paras.69-70. 
53 Chega! Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR), (2005), §12.1. 
54 Cristián Correa, Reparations in Peru: From Recommendations to Implementation, ICTJ, June 2013, 
p16. 
55 Magarrell supra note 20, p93. 
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In the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) the scope of eligible 
victims was connected to those who testified before it. The promotion of reconciliation as part 
of the TRC’s mandate defined victims broadly to include those who suffered harm from gross 
violations of human rights or an act associated with a political objective for which an amnesty 
was granted. 56  Despite this inclusive definition of victimisation, numerous victims were 
excluded from reparations, in particular those who were victimised by other violations not 
falling within the defined gross violations of human rights, harm suffered by acts committed 
by perpetrators not given an amnesty, or did not amount to a ‘political objective’.57  
Narrowing the scope of eligible victims to ensure feasibility and beneficial awards is 
a difficult task. The Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) 
recommended reparations to include all victims of extra-judicial killings, sexual violence, 
torture, forcible transfer, land injustice and historical marginalisation from 1963-2008.58 To 
make this feasible the Commission recommended all should benefit from collective 
reparations, with those most vulnerable to receive individual reparations, such as sexual 
violence and disappearances. Thus through collective measures everyone who suffered harm 
is acknowledged, with other those who suffered the most receiving individual awards. Despite 
this innovative approach, the Kenyan government has yet to implement such a comprehensive 
reparation programme.  
A. The scope of the ‘transition’ 
A more general challenge in transitional justice is delimiting its temporal scope, i.e. ‘what 
exactly transitional justice is transiting “from” and “to”’. 59  In terms of eligibility for 
reparations, how far back should a truth commission or reparation programme go? In the 
United States the debate on reparations for African-American slavery has been raging for 
                                                     
56 Section 1, Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. 
57 Mahmood Mamdani, Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC), Diacritics 32(3–4) (2002) 33–59. 
58 TRJC Report Volume IV, p.63–68 
59 Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke, Does feminism need a theory of transitional justice? An 
introductory essay, International Journal of Transitional Justice 1(1) (2007) 23-44, p35. 
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decades.60 In the Caribbean, heads of states have established a National Commission for 
Reparations to pursue reparations against European states involved in the slave trade and 
indigenous genocide over 400 years ago. Their claim includes harm caused by structural 
inequalities to individuals of African descent in the Caribbean, including illiteracy, chronic 
disease, cultural deprivation, psychological trauma, and scientific and technological 
backwardness.61  
There have been some successes in holding former colonial masters responsible for 
violations in the past. For instance the litigation brought against the British government for 
atrocities committed during the Mau-Mau campaign in Kenya in the 1960s.62 In addition 
attention to the plight of indigenous people has seen some of their land returned and apologies 
made by governments.63 Perhaps a distinction is that in the Mau-Mau case the claimants were 
directly victimised, not their ancestors, whereas claimants for slavery are many generations 
removed from those who enslaved. As such with each generation the harm caused by the 
wrongful act become less discernable and reparations based on more symbolic redress and 
institutional reform, than material need. With indigenous people, international attention to 
their collective spiritual connection to their ancestral land and the legal basis of treaties has 
been a source of redress, as such the harm remains discernable and ongoing despite the 
passage of time. With slavery, not every descendant of a slave will identify himself or herself 
as a victim, as they have agency to shape their own life. Yet there are clear structurally 
inequalities, collective harm and issues of transgenerational trauma caused by the slave trade. 
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It is likely that if any form of reparations is agreed it will be symbolic or transformational, 
rather than compensation, given the distance in time and degree of suffering. 
B. Apportionment amongst family members 
Related to this is the challenge for the law in determining apportionment of reparation 
amongst family members. In cases of mass atrocities, the direct victims may have been killed 
leaving a number of indirect victims as next-of-kin or dependants. Such apportionment of 
reparations does not have to follow domestic inheritance law. The Moroccan Equity and 
Reconciliation Commission (IER) departed from sharia-based inheritance law to give a larger 
percentage to widows (40% rather than 12.5%) instead of the eldest son.64 In Chile the amount 
of pension for a person disappeared or killed was apportioned amongst family members as 40% 
surviving spouse; 30% for mother or father in her absence; 15% for the mother, or the father, as the 
case may be, of the victim's biological children; and 15% for each one of the children of the person. If 
there is more than one child, each received 15% even if exceed the total amount.65 There is an issue 
of maximising resources for those most seriously harmed. As stated by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights in determining the scope of a state’s obligation to those it harmed, 
Every human act produces diverse consequences, some proximate and others remote. 
An old adage puts it as follows: causa causæ est causa causati. Imagine the effect of 
a stone cast into a lake; it will cause concentric circles to ripple over the water, 
moving further and further away and becoming ever more imperceptible. Thus it is 
that all human actions cause remote and distant effects. To compel the perpetrator of 
an illicit act to erase all the consequences produced by his action is completely 
impossible, since that action caused effects that multiplied to a degree that cannot be 
measured.66 
Thus logically speaking it is impossible to oblige a perpetrator or responsible party to redress 
all harm of their actions.  
Nevertheless, there is increasing psychological research supporting the 
transgenerational impact of collective violence that remains unaddressed, whether in terms of 
economic hardship to psychological impact and even carer responsibilities for children and 
                                                     
64 Rubin-Marín supra note 33, p17.  
65 Article 20, Law 19.123, Establishes the National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation and 
Grants other Benefits to Persons as Indicated, Official Gazette No.34 (188), 8 February 1992. 
66 Aloeboetoe and others v Suriname, Judgment of September 10, 1993 (Reparations and Costs), 
para.48. 
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grandchildren of direct victims.67 In the Swiss Bank Holocaust settlement it was recognised 
that given the limited nature of the funds, not all heirs for the purpose of personal injury 
claims should be eligible for compensation, as it would otherwise dilute the amount of money 
available to those directed harmed.68 The eligibility of Japanese-American internees is limited 
to heirs of direct victims who died after the legislation was passed, but before payment of the 
$20,000 compensation.69 Reparations are generally limited to surviving spouses, children, and 
parents (if they had no children). Recognition of eligible victims can be sensitive to such 
surviving heirs’ needs. For children of those disappeared the Chilean National Corporation of 
Reparation and Reconciliation provided a pension as well as military service waivers and 
education support, including university fees and expenses.70 Such reparations, while not fully 
remedying the past, do allow victims and their families new opportunities. The challenge is to 
delineate those who have been sufficiently harmed and continue to need redress, without 
undermining the amount of resources for reparations. 
C. Contested identities 
With scarce resources and reparations acknowledging individuals as ‘deserving’ redress, it 
can give rise to competition between victims and public attacks on individuals’ eligibility.71 
Different communities and actors can presented themselves as victimised to cast the ‘other 
side’ as perpetrators. 72  This is apparent in Palestine/Israel and Northern Ireland, where 
                                                     
67 Marie Breen-Smyth, The needs of individuals and their families injured as a result of the Troubles in 
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68 Judah Gribetz and Shari C. Reig, The Swiss Banks Holocaust Settlement, in Ferstman et al. supra 
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Transitional Democracies, Metaphilosophy 37(3/4) (2006), 449-469, at 459. 
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contested identities of victimhood are used to justify violence.73 This is further complicated 
by victims not all being ‘innocent’, as those victimised by serious violations or crimes can 
also be responsible for causing similar harm to others.74 These complex victims are often 
excluded, as they are considered as not ‘deserving’ of redress. Of course complex victims 
only account for a small number of perpetrators who were victimised. However, it is these 
contentious few who can delay or prevent reparations for other victims. For instance in 
Northern Ireland the inclusion of such individuals in a £12,000 ‘recognition payment’ for all 
those killed during the Troubles/conflict caused protests and media uproar, resulting in a 
comprehensive package on dealing with the past being rejected and negotiations on the past 
being put back years.75 This reflects the moral capital of victimhood, which can be used by 
politicians to advance their own political agenda or for perpetrators to legitimise their 
struggle.76 
Generally speaking it is the dominant political narrative that emerges at the end of the 
conflict or transitional justice process, which can shape the inclusion or exclusion of complex 
victims. In countries, such as Chile, complex victims are eligible for reparations as it is set 
against the dominant political narrative of the wrongfulness of the state’s actions, rather than 
private actors’ responsibility.77 A political narrative of reconciliation can promote that no 
distinction is made between victims, such as in Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission where reparations were recommended to those who suffered the most no matter 
their responsibility.78 In contrast, in Colombia and Peru members of non-state armed groups 
who were victimised, are ineligible for reparations due to their responsibility in victimising 
                                                     
73 See Daniel Bar-Tal, Lily Chernyak-Hai, Noa Schori, and Ayelet Gundar, A Sense of Self-Perceived 
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others.79 Such exclusion is to deny the legitimacy of their struggle, in that they took up arms 
against the democratic government and were subjected to legitimate force by the state, 
therefore they do not deserve reparations.80 In such cases we can see the moral and political 
discourses prevailing over more legal concerns in ensuring redress for serious harm. 
In South Africa there was a strong distinction between perpetrators and victims, with the 
former to be dealt through amnesties and the latter with reparations. Borer and others have 
highlighted that this dichotomy did not capture the composite grey zone of identities, nor 
‘perpetrators [who] are simultaneously victims’. 81  Nevertheless, the South African TRC 
recommended reparations for a number of complex victims. By way of example, in the case 
of the three AWB 82 members who were murdered by a police officer (who received an 
amnesty) in Mafikeng in March 1994, the family members of the deceased were recognised 
as victims and referred to the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee for consideration.83 
The picture of victimisation is further clouded by the exclusion of innocent individuals who 
were wrongly convicted under the apartheid legal system, but were ineligible for amnesty or 
reparations.84  
On surveying a number of transitional justice contexts it is also apparent that state 
security forces continue to receive generous pension or demobilisation packages, as well as 
possibly being eligible for reparations if they were victimised, without excluding those who 
committed atrocities.85 In South Africa a Special Pension Fund was set up to benefit members 
of the state and liberation groups, on the basis of the sacrifices such forces made in the 
                                                     
79 In Colombia - Article 3(5), Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras, Ley (2011). In Colombia 
children in non-state armed groups at the time of demobilisation are eligible for reparations (Article 
3(2)). In Peru - Article 4, Ley que crea el Plan Integral de Reparaciones  (PIR), Ley No.28592 (2006); 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) Vol. IX, at 149 and 153 
80 Root supra note 51, at 131. 
81 Tshepo Madlingozi, Good victim, bad victim: Apartheid's beneficiaries, victims and the struggle for 
social justice, in W. Le Roux (ed.), Law, Memory and the Legacy of Apartheid: Ten years after AZAPO 
v President of South Africa, 107-126, at 114. 
82 Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) a far right paramilitary Afrikaner 
group. 
83 Application in Terms of Section 18 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 
No.34 of 1995. Ontlametse Bernstein Menyatsoe Applicant (AM 7498/97), 5 August 1999, involving 
the deaths of Jacobus Stephanus Uys, Alwyn Wolfaardt and Nicolaas Cornelius Fourie.  
84 Louise Mallinder, Indemnity, Amnesty, Pardon and Prosecution Guidelines in South Africa (2009), 
at 97-98. 
85 Moffett supra note 74. 
 20 
establishment of democracy.86 However, members of non-state armed groups are generally 
excluded from reparation programmes, given their responsibility for victimising others. While 
this may suit the official narrative of the conflict and reestablishment of the state’s monopoly 
on law and order, it fails to ensure a basic tenant of the rule of law that where an individual 
suffers a serious violation they should have equal access to a remedy. This exclusion of 
complex victims has come into conflict with human rights courts, which recognise 
individuals’ right to remedy for gross violation of human rights.87 A compromise position, 
and perhaps one that better reflects reality, would be to take into account complex victims’ 
responsibility in reparation orders, such as a symbolic 10% reduction in compensation 
awards, measures contingent on them apologising to those they victimised, or a review panel 
to assess their harm and responsibility. 88  This distinction between victims and complex 
victims is only further complicated with individual and collective victims. 
D. Individual and collective victims 
Suffering can reflect both individual and collective dimensions. In contrast to domestic 
crimes or private wrongs, international crimes and gross violations of human rights are 
generally perpetrated by ideologically driven armed organisations against groups or civilian 
populations.89 Recognition of the collective harm suffered by groups who were targeted by 
violence can direct public attention to the organised and ideologically driven nature of 
atrocities.90 Collective violence can have a wider social impact, by destroying relationships, 
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‘community bonds, capacities and knowledge’. 91  While individuals are targeted during 
conflict or under authoritarian regimes, due to their identification with a group or even simply 
being a civilian, it does not negate their unique individual experience of victimisation. 
Collectivising victims’ suffering runs the risk of reducing them into ‘an amorphous group of 
passive, voiceless survivors.’92 Suffering is personal, owing to the different circumstances in 
which the violation occurred and the physical, psychological, and social impact on the 
victim.93  
Reparations, to an extent, try to remedy individual and/or collective harm. Individual 
awards of compensation can allow victims to have agency and choice by supplying ‘the 
means for whatever part of the former life and projects remain possible and may allow for 
new ones’.94 As Verdeja asserts ‘individual symbolic recognition emphasizes the importance 
of remembering that victims are not merely a statistic but actual people who often suffered 
intolerable cruelties.’ 95 In Argentina $224,000 was initially awarded to families of those 
disappeared based on the highest earning of public employees, rather than the industrial 
accidents scheme, so as to distinguish their individual harm as intentional, wrongful acts.96  
Collective reparations encompass more symbolic measures aimed at repairing the group 
harm, awakening public understanding and remembrance of victims’ suffering, such as 
apologies, memorials, and guarantees of non-repetition.97 Collective reparations can be more 
economically feasible to implement than individual compensation awards, and can avoid 
hierarchies amongst individuals, as they apply equally to those in the group.98 In Morocco the 
Equity and Reconciliation Commission recommended collective reparations with a 
development and symbolic components, the former to redevelop the economic and social 
ability of communities affected by repression, such as income-generating cooperatives and 
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human rights and gender mainstreaming, with symbolic measures to maintain memory of the 
violence through converting former detention sites into sites of public memory.99  
Collective measures can also better respond to the common interests or suffering of 
victims. By way of example, in Awas Tingi community v Nicaragua the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights awarded compensation collectively to an indigenous group, as their land 
had not been officially recognised or titled to them, reflecting that the group understood land 
as communal ownership.100 Similar collective reparations were recommended in the Timor 
Leste’s truth commission (CAVR) for rehabilitation for widows, recognising that recovery 
occurs in the community, but it has yet to be implemented. 101  Accordingly, collective 
reparations can better fulfil victims’ shared needs.  
Despite the benefits of both individual and collective reparations, there are challenges 
with each. Individual monetary awards to each victim may be economically unviable, 
particularly in terms of a full remedy. Moreover, an administrative scheme will need to be 
established to verify and assess applications for reparation, which can take time, money and 
expertise. 102  Given the collective nature of the violence, victims may group together to 
advance their interests. Yet, individual reparations can cause divisions within such groups and 
communities, as some may be awarded more than others, or not at all. 103  Collective 
reparations are not without their own shortcomings. Collective measures to groups can 
marginalise vulnerable individuals, such as women, children, elderly or other vulnerable 
individuals who have differing needs from the majority. 104  Symbolic measures, such as 
apologies or building memorials, without material compensation or rehabilitation to victims 
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can appear as insincere and empty gestures in redress the past.105 If individual compensation 
awards are not accompanied with acknowledgement of responsibility and tackle the collective 
nature of the violence, they can appear as simply ‘blood money’ to buy victims’ silence.106 
A further difficulty with collective reparations is that individuals may not belong or have 
sufficient connection to or identification with a group. This was apparent in the first 
reparation decision before the ICC in the Lubanga case, where Thomas Lubanga was 
convicted of enlisting and conscripting children to be used in armed hostilities. As Mr 
Lubanga was indigent, the court ruled that reparations were to be collectively made to the 
community to benefit victims of sexual violence and other child soldier. The Court based this 
on the grounds that community reparations would be ‘more beneficial and have greater utility 
than individual awards, given the limited funds available’.107 Nevertheless the court dismissed 
the participating victims’ representations, who wanted individual and collective reparations to 
alleviate their suffering, rather than the community awards, as it was community who 
supported and facilitated such crimes.108 Subsequently, some victims in the Kenyan case of 
Ruto and Sang have ended their participation before the Court over distress that perpetrators 
could collectively benefit from reparations.109 In the Katanga case before the ICC, there is 
strong sentiment amongst victims for individual financial awards, as collective reparations 
will not address their needs.110 
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Collective reparations can be further complicated by being included with developmental 
aid or services to communities. In the Peruvian case, the truth commission (CVR) included 
communities (indigenous, peasants and town) affected by the conflict and internally displaced 
people as eligible for collective reparations. 111  Collective reparations were intended to 
contribute to the reconstructing and strengthening communities by providing them with 
technical and capital resources to do so.112 Key to doing this would be to tailor collective 
reparations through consulting communities on their needs so that measures would respond to 
their experience. Collective reparation measures included human rights and conflict 
resolution training, peace education, support for return and resettlement of those displaced, 
and rebuilding and improving basic services infrastructure.113  
As Segovia points out, with insufficient resources and limited fiscal flexibility, 
governments generally favour funding social programmes than reparations.114 There are clear 
benefits to implementing such social programmes. Development assistance or service 
provision sends a message to victims about ‘belonging and self-esteem’, recognising they are 
citizens and affirming social solidarity with their plight.115 The government is more likely to 
gain political support, as they are investing services and assistance to a wider group of voters, 
than more discrete reparations for victims. Social or development programmes can also be 
delivered without too much additional cost, by being provided through existing government 
services.116 Whereas reparation programmes require a costly set up through the creation of 
new mechanisms, training of staff and developing regulations. In addition development or 
humanitarian assistance is available to all human beings, unlike reparations, which are 
restricted to specific victims.117 
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The conflation of development or services with collective reparations undermines their 
remedial or corrective effect. States are obliged to provide basic service to those within their 
jurisdiction.118 However, simply extending services to communities affected by conflict does 
not satisfy obligations to remedy violations. This is due to development aid and services 
being devoid of any acknowledgement of responsibility or recognition of victims’ suffering. 
Moreover they are an imprecise way of remedying victims’ specific needs in that they are 
aimed at assisting the general community. More critically, services do not empower or enable 
victims to exercise their agency in developing new prospects for the future, such as a 
compensation award; instead they create dependency on state provision, which does not 
directly alleviate their continuing suffering. This abdication of reparations in preference for 
development or services can reflect contention over who is responsible for reparations. 
IV. Who is responsible for reparations?  
Reparations have traditionally been connected to deontological notions of remedy, in that an 
injured party or victim, who has suffered from a wrongful act, violation or crime, has a right 
to seek redress from the perpetrator, who is obliged to follow the law. Responsibility helps to 
distinguish reparations as a form of accountability by evincing the corrective justice 
requirement of the wrongful party remedying the harm they have caused. Responsibility can 
serve a symbolic function in acknowledging and vindicating the wrongfulness of a victim’s 
suffering by directing blame away from them and towards the actor responsible.119  
As with determining eligibility for reparations, responsibility can also frame the 
narrative of the conflict or violence. This is apparent at the inter-state level in the 1919 Treaty 
of Versailles, where Article 231 affirms Germany’s responsibility for the war, the loss and 
damage caused to Allied forces and nationals, and the obligation to make reparations under 
Article 232.120 Similarly in Colombia the 2005 Peace and Justice Law was framed around 
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crimes committed by paramilitary groups and their duty to make reparations, excluding the 
state’s responsibility for harm it had caused to civilians and members of such groups.121 
The difficulty with most of the literature on transitional justice and reparations is that 
it is framed around the traditional state-centric notion of responsibility. There are good 
reasons for this beyond the international law influence,122 due to the fact that most of the 
violence in the past century, such as in focal points in Latin American, Europe and South 
Africa, have been dominated by systematic atrocities committed by state forces and 
democracies emerging from post-authoritarianism or apartheid.  Moreover the international 
legal order offers a reciprocal obligation system amongst states, which has reinforced 
reparations as a legal consequence of their wrongful acts.123 However with the growth of 
internal armed conflicts and globalisation, non-state actors are increasingly committing 
atrocities. For instance in Peru, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) found that 
the non-state armed group the Shining Path was responsible for 46% of violations, including 
extra-judicial executions and disappearances, with state forces responsible for 30%. 124 
Similarly in Northern Ireland 90% of the 3,600 conflict-related deaths were committed by 
Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups.125 Accordingly the messy reality of conflicts 
means that a simply state-centric framework is inadequate to capture the complex web of 
responsibility for atrocities by different actors and institutions. 
The 2005 UN Basic Principles on Reparations and the 2007 Nairobi Declaration 
suggest that any other legal entity or person found responsible for gross violations should 
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make reparations for victims, as tackling impunity should include all responsible actors.126 
Unlike the state-centric nature of international law, reparations in transitional contexts can be 
constructed to reflect the responsibility of different actors. In Colombia under Laws 975 
(2005) and 1148 (2011) reparations can be ordered against paramilitary and state forces 
responsible for violations or crimes. In Guatemala while state forces and local defence forces 
were responsible for the vast majority of massacres, other actors, such as the World Bank, 
were found complicit in certain massacres and have made reparations to victims, such as the 
Rio Negro massacres in the construction of the Chixoy dam. 127 In the DRC, the mobile 
military courts have found government soldiers, the state and local militias jointly responsible 
for massacres and other atrocities also liable for reparations to the victims.128 
Of course transitional justice is not just about accountability, but also trying to 
achieve reconciliation, peace and stability. Instead what emerges is that the state provides 
reparations including victims of non-state actors’ atrocities, on the basis of social solidarity or 
to ensure victims receive some redress. The 2005 UN Basic Principles on Reparations also 
support the principle of subsidiarity, in that states should establish national reparation 
programmes and other assistance to victims in the event that ‘the parties liable for the harm 
suffered are unable or unwilling to meet their obligation.’129 This principle of subsidiarity 
means that where an armed group has obligations to provide reparations and can be held 
responsible to fulfil such duties to victims for international crimes, the state can facilitate this 
through creating independent reparation mechanisms. Alternatively if the armed group is 
unable to meet its commitment, the state acts in a subsidiary role to provide reparations 
directly to victims of non-state actors’ violations, as a sort of remedial guarantor. Thereby 
subsidiarity ensures that victims have access to a remedy either way.  
                                                     
126 Paras.15 and 16 UNBPG; paras.5 and 6, 2007 Nairobi Declaration. 
127  Río Negro Massacres v Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment of 4 September 2012, (IACtHR) Series C No. 250; and April 2010 Reparation Plan for 
Damages Suffered by the Communities Affected by the Construction of the Chixoy Hydroelectric Dam 
in Guatemala. 
128 See Avocats Sans Frontieres, Case Study: The Application of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court by the Courts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (2009). 
129 Principle 16. See also Principle 17 on the enforcement of domestic and foreign reparations decisions 
against individuals or entities liable for harm suffered; and Principle 3, Chicago Principles of Post-
Conflict Justice (2008), The International Human Rights Law Institute, p46. 
 28 
The principles of subsidiarity and social solidarity with victims is apparent in a 
number of contexts. In the aftermath of Timor Leste’s succession from Indonesia, the 
Timorese Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CAVR) found that despite the Indonesian 
state being responsible for the majority of atrocities, it might take years to seek redress from 
them. Instead the CAVR recommended that the Timor Leste government take responsibility 
to provide reparations, as seeking redress from Indonesia would be too long for victims to 
wait.130 In South Africa, the provision of amnesties to a number of individuals who testified 
before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission prevented victims from seeking civil 
redress. Some of the victims appealed to the South African Constitutional Court, which ruled 
that the state was entitled to extinguish individual criminal and civil liability.131 This was 
based on the grounds that responsibility for reparations would instead be shouldered by the 
state, thus reflecting a more transactional arrangement in managing different interests in 
navigating the transition.132 This approach reflects human rights standards on state obligations 
to ensure respect for human rights, including effective investigations and access to redress, in 
that while the state may not be directly responsible for the victims’ suffering, it is should 
ensure victims have access to a remedy.133  
Correspondingly, actions of non-state actors can be attributed to the state if it had 
knowledge of violations or control over such actors. The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights in the Ituango Massacre v Colombia case civilians were murdered by non-state 
paramilitary forces, who also looted, detained, tortured, and displaced the remaining civilian 
population. The court ordered the Colombian government to provide reparations to the 
victims, as it was responsible for failing to protect its citizens and to properly investigate, 
prosecute, and punish those responsible. 134  Accordingly, human rights law establishes a 
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minimum, where even the state has fulfilled its obligations in redressing violations it is 
responsible for, it may extend reparations to victims committed by other non-state actors on 
more moral grounds of social solidarity with their suffering.135 
In practice very few countries have implemented reparations programmes in times of 
transitional justice, meaning that victims have often turned to human rights courts as the main 
avenue of redress. However, human rights courts have struggled to grapple with a more 
pluralistic understanding of responsibility of different actors and their liability for reparations. 
Human rights obligations have been framed to protect individuals against the state, but 
limited in their ability to guide states in implementing reparation programmes are 
problematic. This can be seen in cases involving members of non-state armed groups who are 
responsible for committing violence, but been victimised by the state in Peru, Northern 
Ireland and Spain. In such cases human rights courts, tied to the state’s obligation under 
relevant conventions, have upheld the right of the individual to reparation, despite that many 
of the victims of such non-state armed groups remain without reparations domestically.136 Yet 
human rights courts remain a last resort where domestic remedies have been exhausted. States 
should be attune to the deleterious and asymmetrical effect of a reparation order before a 
regional human rights court and should pre-empt such eventualities by creating reparation 
programmes for all victims. 
V. The process and mechanisms of reparations 
While most of our discussion so far has focused on the substantive and political dimensions 
of reparations, in this final section it is worth examining the process and mechanisms that 
have been developed in transitional countries to deliver remedial measures. In legal terms 
reparations as remedial measures can be conceptualised in procedural and substantive 
terms.137 We have discussed the substantive content of reparations, such as compensation. 
The procedural aspect of remedy reflects procedural justice concerns, in that those who have 
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their interests affected, i.e. victims, should have access to and be able to participate in 
proceedings. By enabling victims to have their views and concerns heard in reparation 
proceedings it can impact on decision-making, thereby shaping substantive outcomes.138 This 
also requires judges and courts to be impartial and sensitive in facilitating victims’ input.139 
The 2005 UN Basic Principles on Reparations (UNBPG) teases out such concerns by 
suggesting that states should ensure equal and effective access to justice; access to 
information; provide assistance and legal advice to facilitate their access and participation; 
treat victims fairly; and protect their integrity, privacy and well-being. 
A. Reparations as a process 
In psychological terms, reparation processes can be important to victims, as it helps to convey 
the public acknowledgement of their suffering and the symbolism attached to reparations.140 
Victim definitions can be sensitive to victims’ psychological needs, such as in Argentina the 
creation of the legal category of ‘missing as a result of enforced disappearance’. 141  In 
addition, consulting victims and allowing them to participating in the decision-making 
process can affirm their status as citizens in the new political order, in that their voices and 
interests have value. Hamber suggests that this fosters ‘social belonging…[and] helps 
counter...the consequences of ‘extreme’ political trauma’.142 There is also a need to provide 
‘ongoing spaces’ for victims to ‘express their feelings of sadness and rage as they struggle to 
come to terms with the psychological and emotional impact of their loss.’143 Such spaces 
should be private (such as counselling and group story-telling) and public (e.g. media, theatre, 
etc.), as well as official and facilitated through civil society.144 These spaces can be achieved 
through formal state processes, and informal community gatherings or within victim groups. 
Participation in the design and process of reparation mechanisms can also offer recognition to 
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victims as ‘valuable agents of political and social transformation’, in particular for those 
groups previously marginalised, such as women and minorities.145 
Process is not just psychological or procedural, but it also entails a temporal 
dimension. In the aftermath of collective violence victims may seek to normalise their 
position in the community by assimilating, rather than wanting to publicly distinguish 
themselves as victims. 146 It can take time for victims to organise and claim reparations. 
Society also needs time to engender shared public acceptance and understanding of the need 
for reparations to become a political priority. In the US, reparations to those Japanese-
American interned during the Second World War, were only provided an apology letter and a 
cheque for $20,000 in 1988, after over four decades of victims campaigning and litigating.147 
Starzyk and others suggest that it depends on society viewing reparations as feasible, in that it 
does not compromise valuable social resources.148 Moreover, Osiel argues that communities 
or societies are unlikely to sacrifice sacred values and issues of concern, such as recognising 
complex victims as eligible for reparations, unless the opposing side is willing to do the 
same. 149  Thus gaining traction on the reparations debate is more than just political or 
economic wrangling, but a more nuanced social and moral steering that inevitably takes time 
to be normalised or accepted. 
Time can also have the effect of diminishing reparations as a public priority where 
they are no longer perceived as feasible. For instances in South Africa, reparations were a key 
part of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s mandate, which in the end recommended 
$2,700 for six years to each victim who testified before the TRC, some 22,000 individuals.150 
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However, the South African government took nearly seven years from the initiation of the 
TRC until it paid reparations to those victims, even then it reduced the sum to a single $4,900 
payment.151 In the interim victims had been vilified by the government that their pursuit of 
reparations was for financial gain or greed, than for the economic development of the 
country.152 The sad fact is that time works against victims, many of whom will die before 
seeing an award. The passage of time means that reparations may only benefit the direct 
victims’ descendants or next of kin, lessening it remedial effect and making such measures 
appear more like distributive justice than corrective redress.153 
States often do not get reparations right the first time, involving amendments or a 
series of reparation laws and mechanisms, as the scope of beneficiaries is expanded to include 
those previously invisible to the public consciousness. In Chile there have been some 19 
programmes or amendments to existing ones from 1990-2013.154 In Morocco the Independent 
Arbitration Panel was established in 1999 awarding compensation to victims of enforced 
disappearances and illegal detention. The Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER) 
followed in 2004, which recommended more inclusive reparations to those subjected to other 
violations such as torture, extrajudicial executions and sexual violence, amongst others. The 
IER widened the provisions of compensation to these victims, as well as recommending 
rehabilitation, restoration of civil rights and personal property.155  
It can also take time to mobilise public resource or consolidating public debts to 
facilitate reparations. In Argentina compensation was first paid out to those illegally detained 
amounting to some $1.17 billion, then a further $1.9 billion to families of those disappeared, 
based on the issue of public bonds. However, the economic crisis in 2003 caused Argentina to 
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rethink the amount of reparations with further wards in Argentine pesos than US dollars.156 
Yet, issues of public debt and feasibility of funding reparations should not inhibit a state from 
making reparations, even if this means adopting pensions over lump sums. Current talks 
between the Colombian government and FARC have outlined an ambitious $37 billion 
reparation package for the victims of the conflict, using in part oil revenue.157 
In terms of guiding principles for reparation processes there are five general 
principles: (1) completeness and comprehensive; (2) complex and coherent; (3) appropriate 
and proportionate; (4) acknowledgement; and (5) transformative. First, completeness and 
comprehensiveness involve as far as possible including all atrocities and victims who have 
suffered serious harm, as discussed this can be impossible.158 However, governments should 
be attuned to enabling redress for all victims who suffer serious harm, otherwise it may be a 
further source of victimisation and political marginalisation. Special attention should be made 
to ensure inclusion of politically marginalised groups, such as women, children, and 
minorities in reparation programmes. 159  As Rombouts notes in Rwanda the exclusion of 
victims of Rwandan state forces from reparations has hindered wider goals of 
reconciliation.160   
Second reparation mechanisms should be complex by including different types of 
reparations, individual and collective measures. Such measures should be internally and 
externally coherent with both the reparations order and complement other transitional justice 
approach such as trial and truth commissions.161 Third in terms of being proportionate, human 
rights reparation principles support that awards should not enrich or impoverish victims, but 
be equal to their harm.162 Reparations are intended to restore victims’ dignity and autonomy, 
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not to undermine their self-respect or be condescending. 163 Thus appropriate reparations 
should be responsive to victims’ needs and interests to be effective. Fourth, reparations 
should publicly acknowledge victims’ suffering and dignity, as well as the responsibility of 
those who committed, facilitated or were complicit it their harm. Such acknowledgement 
should be directly made to the individual, as well as publicised to society to create public 
awareness and understanding of the past. Finally, Rubio-Marín suggests that reparations 
should also have a transformative potential, in that programmes tackle underlying structural 
inequalities, such as in gender.164 
 It is perhaps helpful to think of reparations as both a process and an outcome, 
whereby victims’ input into reparation mechanisms can better inform the decision making 
process in determining eligibility, apportionment and appropriate measures. As such, victim 
participation can facilitate completeness and comprehensive for reparation programmes, 
minimising years of litigation or further mechanisms.165 Yet, Waterhouse notes that most 
programmes fail in providing a meaningful role for victims in negotiating and processes, 
undermining the effectiveness of their outcomes.166 Making legal provisions for victims to 
participate or be consulted is not enough. Access to reparations also requires effective 
outreach and information to victims and affected communities, as well as capacity building 
and support for victim groups and civil society. In the case of Peru, where collective 
reparations were created in consultation with victimised communities, Correa notes that some 
found it difficult to access technical support to make informed decisions in implementing 
projects. As a result, some local government officials manipulated the funding for the 
projects, which did not primarily focus on the victimised communities’ interests.167  
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While legal and psychological understandings of procedural justice and victims’ 
needs provide an outline of what states should devise, in reality the negotiating of reparations 
involve more crude political dealings.168 Nevertheless, neglecting certain victims, adopting a 
top-down approach to process, or failing to provide effective remedies will cause protracted 
litigation. The Inter-American and European Human Rights Courts have noted that the failure 
to deliver redress for serious violations of human rights aggravates the harm and can amount 
to inhuman and degrading treatment.169 States should provide prompt redress and engage in a 
public information campaign about victims’ access to reparation programmes and 
participation in its development. Wider society also needs to be sensitised on victims’ 
suffering and the significance of reparations in redressing the past and ensuring future 
reconciliation. Without this sensitising information campaign victims can often be resented 
for receiving ‘benefits’ or belittled as being seen as ‘useless’. 170  Accordingly reparation 
processes go beyond the legal construction of procedure. It is necessary that reparation 
programmes and mechanisms are inclusive to victims and remain a public priority, a difficult 
balance of procedural justice and public engagement. 
B. Reparation mechanisms 
Reparations can be ordered, recommended or delivered through a number of mechanisms. 
This section discusses the four main types: courts; truth commissions; reparation 
programmes; and inter-state procedures. In the absence of a reparation programme, victims 
often turn to the courts for redress, both during violence and in the aftermath. Of course 
recourse to the courts is very much limited to finding sufficient resources to fund such cases 
and evidence of victims’ harm and the perpetrators’ responsibility. In times of collective 
violence the administration of justice is often unable to operate or unwilling to do so, whether 
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through authoritarian state or threat to security from non-state actors. Court settlements can 
achieve an outcome for victims, but those responsible can limit or absolve their liability. As 
with the Mau-Mau claim against the British government, the government apologised and paid 
out nearly £20 million in compensation, but it denied its liability for violations committed by 
the colonial administration. Ultimately with mass atrocities recourse to the courts is for the 
fortunate few, who do not represent or speak for all victims. 
Civil litigation can provide an avenue for seeking justice and maintain public 
awareness of victims’ plight. This is apparent in the case brought by some of the families of 
the Omagh bombing in Northern Ireland, where 29 civilians were killed by a bomb planted by 
the Real IRA, were awarded £1.6million compensation award against four senior members of 
the organisation, after no one was convicted for the bombing.171 As noted above, litigation 
and court-based awards for reparations are individualistic and unworkable for mass atrocities. 
Nevertheless, civil litigation plays an important part in instigating, sustaining and re-
examining a wider discussion on reparation claims. Collective claims by victim groups can 
help to develop solidarity amongst members and their technical skills, such as administration, 
advocacy and fundraising, in a sense self-empowering.172 Larger administrative reparation 
schemes do not always run smoothly, and are often subjected to judicial scrutiny, which can 
improve or clarify the scope of reparations.173  
Truth commissions can be apposite forum for recommending mass reparation 
programmes, as they collect information on victimisation, the number of victims, impact on 
groups, and those organisations responsible, making them well placed to make 
recommendations on appropriate reparations. 174  However, not all truth commissions’ 
recommendations on reparations are implemented, such as in Kenya and South Africa. The 
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short-term nature of truth commissions means that they lack the mandate to ensure their 
recommendations on reparations are implemented once their term is complete.175  
Generally in times of transition, reparations are delivered through a separate 
mechanism, which assesses eligibility and administers awards. In contrast to court-based 
reparations, these more political negotiated national reparation programmes reflect the 
collective responsibility of the state, rather than individuals, and aim to deliver redress to 
large numbers of individuals, making them more comprehensive.176 Rules of court procedure 
and evidence for ordinary crimes and private wrongs can be insufficient to deal with 
exceptional nature of mass atrocities. 177  Instead reparation programmes provide large 
administrative schemes, which can cope with thousands of victims in a generalised way by 
stratifying them based on harm and apportionment. While we segregate different mechanisms 
and processes for the purpose of analysis, in practice reparations can be recommended in a 
peace agreement or a truth commission, litigated in courts, advocated on the streets, and 
delivered through reparation programmes, such as in Colombia and South Africa. 
Accordingly reparations can be a contested process that takes time to refine. Consultation 
with victims and community sensitisation can reduce such contention, emphasising the 
importance of an effective process.178 
For inter-state conflicts international arbitration bodies can adjudicate and administrate 
reparations, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration with the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims 
Commission, or specialised bodies, such as the UN Compensation Commission on Iraq-
Kuwait 179  Alternatively peace agreements can facilitate reparations amongst states. 180  Of 
course states can make recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for redress for 
injury suffered by the state and its citizens, but such adversarial contests can take time, and 
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there is weak enforcement powers. This is apparent in the DRC v Uganda case, where the ICJ 
found Ugandan state forces responsible for violations of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law and ordered it to make reparations, which were claimed at 
$10-15 billion, but this has not been made over a decade later, with renewed proceedings 
beginning in 2016.181 As a result there can be a myriad of reparation processes at domestic, 
regional and international level, with reparations in the DRC reappearing at the ICC and 
domestic military courts.182 This indicates a lack of comprehensive redress at the domestic 
level, forcing victims to seek justice beyond the state. 
C. Evidential and financial challenges 
Two of the biggest practical challenges in designing and operating a reparation programme 
are finding sufficient evidence to support claims and financial resources. With the first of 
these, there can be a number of problems with evidence verification: incomplete evidence; 
vast amount of information received; time-period for submissions; different languages; 
illiteracy amongst claimants; and fraudulent claims.183 Some of these issues can be resolved 
by relaxing evidential standards.184 As noted by the Iraq-Kuwait UN Claims Commission the 
general situation of emergency and breakdown of civil order, resulted in a scarcity of 
evidence meaning many victims would be unable to provide sufficient evidence to support 
their claims. Thus taking a flexible approach the UNCC required claimants to provide 
‘simply’ documentation on the proof of the fact and the date of injury or death.185  
 Not all claimants will have the same access to evidence. Women, elderly and disabled 
can be marginalised from completing applications and reparation processes by their physical 
immobility, illiteracy, or stigma. 186  Thus there is an acute need for outreach to inform 
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claimants of the reparation scheme, application forms and deadlines.187 In Timor-Leste the 
commission kept its application deadline open for two years after closing of its mandate to 
ensure most victims could access redress. 188 However, extending deadlines and lowering 
evidential burdens brings the risk of fraudulent claims, such as members of a neo-Nazi group 
claiming compensation from a Holocaust claims process to deplete funds available for 
victims.189 There remains a need to scrutinise applications. 
A significant challenge eluded throughout this chapter has been the financing of such 
reparation programmes. Often states lack the political will to finance reparation programmes. 
UN Special Rapporteur Pablo de Greiff argues that the  
state cannot simply ignore the claims of victims with the argument that there are no 
resources to cover the corresponding costs, or alleging that there is simply no way to 
overcome the problems described. This would be tantamount to acknowledging that it 
is in no position to sustain a fair regime.190  
Yet he notes that states often do not initiate reparation programmes as they are ‘unaffordable’ 
or compete with resources for reconstruction and economic development.191 Two of the main 
ways to fund reparation programmes in many transitional contexts is through funds or a 
dedicated budget line.192 De Greiff suggests that dedicated budget lines are more successful 
than funds, as dedicated budget lines represent clear political commitment to redressing 
victims’ suffering.193  
There are financial alternatives, such as micro-financing schemes for victims, 194 
special taxes,195 or seizing assets (in the Philippines with former President Marcos196 and 
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paramilitaries in Colombia197), but these can be unpopular and raise separate implementation 
issues. Correa suggests that states can prioritise reparations over defence budgets. 198 The 
modalities of awarding individual reparations can also be creative and staggered over time to 
avoid large initial lump sum payments, such as pensions, university scholarships, or medical 
coupons for rehabilitation, as suggested by the Kenyan TJRC. Such measures also need to be 
complemented with wider provision of collective reparation, such as memorials, and basic 
social provision such as education, housing and healthcare. Otherwise compensation awards 
will be quickly exhausted paying for these basic service, rather than allowing the victim to 
use it to alleviate their daily suffering and provide new opportunities.199 Such support should 
be used in conjunction with development programs and NGO assistance so as to ensure 
communal and societal reconstruction.200 
As reparation processes can take years, interim reparations are vital to ensure some 
measures of provisional relief of victims’ suffering. In Sierra Leone to kick-start the 
reparation programme the UN provided $3 million, of which victims who made applications 
received $100 each before receiving reparations later on.201 However, there is a danger that 
interim reparation awards may appear as more humanitarian assistance if used in the long 
term. This is the case in Nepal where awards and services have been provided to victims, 
without acknowledging the state’s responsibility and treating victims as beneficiaries, rather 
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than right-holders.202 Accordingly while there are serious evidential and financial challenges 
with reparation programmes for mass atrocities, creative ways can be fashioned if there is 
sufficient political will. 
VI. Conclusion  
Reparations in transitional societies abound with practical and financial concerns, human 
rights law requires victims of gross violations of human rights to have access to an effective 
remedy. Using reparations and victim eligibility as a political bargaining chip or a ‘gesture of 
solidarity’ in promoting reconciliation trivialises reparations as a justice and accountability 
measure in times of transition.203 Politicising identities in determining who can and cannot 
receive reparations based on their background, rather than their victimisation, only serves to 
entrench the official narrative of the conflict into legal measures, giving rise to possible 
sources of victimisation in the future. Such tactics undermine the rule of law, in that everyone 
who suffers serious harm should have access to a remedy. While the law can be shaped to fit 
the bespoke political interests of each transitional context, international declarations, such as 
the 2005 UN Basic Principles of Reparations, should serve as guidance in delivering effective 
redress. 
A major challenge to reparations in times of transition is not getting them on the 
political agenda or recommended by a truth commission, but having them implemented. 
Gaining social acceptance as to the need and feasibility of reparations is a delicate balance, 
which takes time. Victims are often at the forefront in litigating, advocating and negotiating 
their right to reparations. In terms of sensitising society on the necessity of reparations 
perhaps snowballing a compensation program for a small group of victims into subsequently 
larger and more comprehensive process, as in Chile, can normalise the need for reparations. 
What is apparent from this survey of reparations in transitional contexts is that there exists a 
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myriad of approaches in redressing mass atrocities. While there are significant practical, 
financial and political challenges to provide reparations, creative solutions can be engineered 
to overcome these concerns. If not, victims and their descendants will continue their pursuit 
of justice through reparations for many years to come. 
 
 
 
